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Research Objective
We study the influence of heterogeneity on 
member preferences (i.e., utility) for attributes 
that drive cooperative structure in an empirical 
context. 
2Motivation
? The study of economic behavior requires the empirical 
investigation of heterogeneity and diversity in the 
economic life of different market actors (Heckman 
2001);
? Individuals (i.e., producers) respond differently to 
economic stimuli: Studying heterogeneous behavior  ?
formulation of economic policy.
Agricultural Economics Literature
? 1980’s : Recognition of decision-makers’ (i.e., farmers) 
heterogeneity on agribusinesses decision-making, i.e., 
cooperative firms, caused by:
?member firms’ economic size;
? production outputs;
?entrepreneurial skills;
? asymmetric bargaining power;
?Risk preferences.
? 1990’s: Theoretical research and modeling refined (i.e., 
game-theory; neoinstitutional economics);
3Constraints & Challenge
?Current Constraints:
?Lack of realism; solid case studies (Cotterill, 2002)
?Unbalanced tradeoffs between formalism and 
realism (Cook et al, 2004)
?The study of decision-making behavior of 
heterogeneous members using subjective 
evaluations has been the challenge of empirical 
validation
Research Approach & Question
? Behavioral Approach: allows individual decision
makers’ (i.e., members’) subjective evaluations (i.e., 
preferences) to be incorporated into formal decision 
analysis for the study of complex business problems 
(i.e., Keeney and Raiffa, 1972, 1993, McFadden, 1999).
? What is the subjective utility that heterogeneous 
members attach to different levels of cooperative 
structure? 
4Cooperative Structure
Modeling Framework (1): Conjoint
? Conjoint analysis is grounded in the utility framework 
( Green and Srinivasan, 1978)
? We assume that the levels of cooperative’s 
structural attributes contribute in an additive way 
to member preferences.
? The conjoint model can be formulated as follows:
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5Modeling Framework (2): Mixture-Regression
? We use a generalized linear regression mixture model 
(Wedel and DeSabro, 1995)  which allows us to identify 
segments of members, which behave according to the 
same regression (con-joint) equation.
? Within a segment, each member’s responses can be 
adequately reflected by the regression equation, while this 
regression equation differs across segments. 
Modelling Framework(2): Mixture-Regression
? The unconditional distribution of yn is obtained as (De 
Sabro and Croon, 1988):
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6Decision Context (1)
? VTN/The Greenery (Netherlands): Dutch MC of fresh 
produce (fruit & vegetables) resulted after the merger 
of nine auctions in 1996.
? The Greenery is a distribution, sales, and marketing 
company whose shares are owned by the horticultural 
co-op VTN.
? 2002: 3000 members 
? The majority of VTN/TG’s members are small, family 
owned, with the manager often being the owner.
Decision Context (2)
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7Decision Context (3)
?Loss of Members’ Commitment:
?mismatch between producers’ vision and management ;
? “unity in diversity” policy : members associations (EU 
subsidies);
?concerns regarding the transparency in the corporate 
management of the organization;
? organizational restructuring of the VTN/TG is an ongoing 
process.
Research Design
? Qualitative Research: 
? Desk-research; 
? Discussions between co-op experts and managers of 
VTN/The Greenery; and 
? 2 group discussions (15 members in each discussion, 
Spring-Summer 2002)
? Quantitative Research: 
? Experimental Conjoint Study : 120 Members (Spring -
Winter 2003)
8Focus Group Results (1)
Attribute Levels
Entrepreneurial Market-Oriented OrganizationBusiness Issue/Scope
Intermediary Organization
VTN:  BOD (Members)
TG: Managers supervised by BOD of VTN
Corporate
Governance
VTN: Managers supervised by BOD of VTN
TG: Managers supervised by Prof. Board.
ManagersProduct-related
Decision-Making Members
Focus Group Results (2)
Attribute Levels
General reservesFinancial Structure
Individualized equity
Product priceMembers’ Benefits
Product price & return on capital
General grading of productsProduct Quality
Specific/client’s grading of products
9Design of Conjoint Study
? Full-profile conjoint method (Green and Srinivasan, 1978)
? Fractional factorial orthogonal main-effects design: 
? 8 calibration profiles
? 3 graded paired comparisons
? self-constructed MC
? Pilot test : 8 face-to-face computer-guided interviews.
? Sampling: a) economic & financial criteria (largest in size 
members), and b) the degree of participation in the MC’s 
functioning (participation in decision making committees at 
corporate and product-related level): 120 computer-guided 
face-to-face interviews
* p  < 0.05
Table 1: Average Part Worths of  MC’s Attributes based on Individual Estimates    
APWs  Std. D.  Std.E. Percentiles 
   25 50     75 
Business Issue/Scope 
 Entrepreneurial market-oriented organ. 
    Intermediary organisation  
 
 
   0.309* 
-0.309 
 
0.560 
 
0.051 
 
0.000 
 
0.250 
 
0.625 
Corporate Governance 
VTN: governed by BOD (members); 
          TG: governed by managers supervised by VTN’s BOD
          VTN: governed by managers supervised by BOD  
          TG: governed by managers supervised by experts 
 
 
   0.183* 
-0.183 
 
 
0.643 
 
 
0.054 
 
 
 
 
-0.125   
 
 
0.125 
 
 
0.625 
Product-related Decision-Making 
    Members 
    Managers 
 
   0.247* 
  -0.247 
 
0.636 
 
0.058 
 
-0.125 
 
0.250 
 
0.625 
 
 
 
10
* p  < 0.05
Table 1: Average Part Worths of  MC’s Attributes based on Individual Estimates   
 APWs Std. D. Std.E.    Percentiles 
    25 50        75 
Financial Structure 
    General reserves 
     Individualised equity 
 
-0.215 
   0.215* 
 
 
0.501 
 
 
0.046 
 
  
 0.500 
 
 
 -0.125 
 
 
0.125 
Member Benefits 
    Product price 
    Product price & return on capital 
  
-0.213 
   0.213* 
 
 
0.515 
 
 
0.047 
 
 
-0.125 
 
 
 
0.125 
 
 
0.500 
Product Quality 
    General grading of products 
    Specific/clients’ grading of products 
  
  -0.271 
   0.271* 
 
 
 
0.571    
 
 
0.052 
 
 
-0.125 
 
 
0.250 
 
 
0.625 
 
MC’s Attributes’ Importance
18.7%
14.8%
14.9%
17.2%
13%
21.4%
0 5 10 15 20 25
Product Quality
Members' Benefits
Financial Structure
Prodcut-related DM
Corporate Governance
Business Scope
(%)
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p < 0.05
Table 2: Aggregate Mixture Regression Parameter Estimates (N=120)a 
 Coefficient Estimates 
Business Issue/Scope -0.604* 
Corporate Governance -0.358* 
Product-related DM -0.483* 
Financial Structure  0.420* 
Member Benefits  0.416* 
Product Quality  0.529* 
Intercept                                  0.118 
  
Log Likelihood 
                            -1921.2 
CAIC                              3905.4 
R2    0.023 
Table 3:  Fit Statistics of the Mixture Models for the Segments, S =1 to S=6 
Segments 
S 
Log-likelihood CAIC Es R2 
1 -1731 3525 1.000 0.034 
2 -1682 3497 0.767 0.097 
3 -1661 3527 0.752 0.216 
4 -1647 3569 0.750 0.267 
5 -1633 3613 0.794 0.280 
6 -1618 3654 0.822 0.309 
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* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.10
Table 4: Mixture Regression Results for the Two-segment Solution 
 s =1 s = 2 
Regression Coefficients    
Business Issue/Scope -0.740*        -0.318* 
Corporate Governance -0.594*          0.135* 
Product-related Decision-Making -0.828*          0.237* 
Financial Structure  0.670*           -0.100** 
Members Benefits  0.449*          0.348* 
Product Quality  0.647*          0.281* 
Table 5: Profiling the Segments (1) 
 s =1 s = 2 
Percentage of producer member type in segments   
Fruit-producers 30,7% (n=12) 25,9% (n=21) 
Vegetable-producers 69,3% (n=27) 74,1% (n=60) 
Descriptive statistics for identified segmentsb   
Average number of employees 62 10 
             Full time employees 32  4 
             Seasonal employees 30  6 
Annual gross revenue (in Euro)   
< 250.000 24.3% 45.0% 
250.000 – 750.000 28,2% 49.8% 
> 750.000 47,5% 5,2% 
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Table 6: Profiling the Segments (2) 
               s =1          s = 2                    Significancec 
                                       
    Mean SDb  Mean SD 
Attitude towards innovation 4.3 0.7      4.2              0.9         0.655 
Market-orientation 5.9 0.9     6.0              0.7           0.405 
Risk-attitude 5.0 1.5      4.2              1.2 0.035 
 
Conclusions
? The identified attributed drive significantly producers 
preferences regarding the  cooperative structure;
? Co-op attributes are not equally preferred throughout 
our sample because of:
? Economic size of member firms
? Risk attitude of members
? Members in both segments attach high importance to 
strategic attributes
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Implications
?Theory
?Provide guidelines for conceptualization of 
cooperative structure subject to heterogeneous 
membership (i.e., sources of members derived utility);
? Impact of unobserved heterogeneity in designing 
marketing cooperative structure may enhance insights 
for factors should be considered in the study of 
cooperative constitutional setting/reengineering. 
Implications
?Practice
?The identification and evaluation of attributes that 
member attach high importance (i.e., strategic) may 
ameliorate members’ commitment;
?Development of differential policies in order to 
satisfy heterogeneous members’ demands
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Limitations
? Usefulness of these attributes for cooperatives that 
operate in other production sectors or other cooperative 
models;
? Possibility that interaction effects among the levels of the 
examined attributes exists; 
? Analysis of members risk preferences
? effects that preferences and incentives of cooperative 
agents (i.e., professional management) may have on the 
cooperative structure
